About being the Tortoise or the Hare? - A Position Paper on Making Cloud
  Applications too Fast and Furious for Attackers by Kratzke, Nane
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
03
56
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 F
eb
 20
18
About being the Tortoise or the Hare?
A Position Paper on Making Cloud Applications too Fast and Furious for Attackers
Nane Kratzke
Lu¨beck University of Applied Sciences
Center of Excellence for Communication, Systems, and Applications (CoSA)
Mo¨nkhofer Weg 239, 23562 Lu¨beck, Germany
nane.kratzke@fh-luebeck.de
Keywords: Immune System; Cloud-native Application; Zero-day; Exploit; Cloud; Application; Security
Abstract: Cloud applications expose – beside service endpoints – also potential or actual vulnerabilities. And attackers
have several advantages on their side. They can select the weapons, the point of time and the point of attack.
Very often cloud application security engineering efforts focus to harden the fortress walls but seldom assume
that attacks may be successful. So, cloud applications rely on their defensive walls but seldom attack intruders
actively. Biological systems are different. They accept that defensive “walls” can be breached at several
layers and therefore make use of an active and adaptive defense system to attack potential intruders - an
immune system. This position paper proposes such an immune system inspired approach to ensure that even
undetected intruders can be purged out of cloud applications. This makes it much harder for intruders to
maintain a presence on victim systems. Evaluation experiments with popular cloud service infrastructures
(Amazon Web Services, Google Compute Engine, Azure and OpenStack) showed that this could minimize the
undetected acting period of intruders down to minutes.
1 INTRODUCTION
“The Tortoise and the Hare” is one of Aesop’s most
famous fables where ingenuity and trickery are em-
ployed by the tortoise to overcome a stronger oppo-
nent – the hare. Regarding this paper and according
to this fable, the hare is an attacker and the tortoise
is an operation entity responsible to protect a cloud
system against security breaches. Zero-day exploits
make this game an unfair game. How to protect a
cloud system against threats that are unknown to the
operator? But, when the game itself is unfair, should
not the system operation entity be unfair as well? That
is basically what this position paper is about. How to
build “unfair” cloud systems that permanently jangle
attackers nerves.
Cloud computing enables a variety of innovative
Table 1: Some popular open source elastic platforms
Platform Contributors URL
Kubernetes Cloud Native Found. http://kubernetes.io
Swarm Docker https://docker.io
Mesos Apache http://mesos.apache.org/
Nomad Hashicorp https://nomadproject.io/
IT-enabled business and service models and many re-
search studies and programs focus to develop systems
in a responsible way to ensure the security and pri-
vacy of users. But compliance with standards, au-
dits and checklists, does not automatically equal se-
curity (Duncan and Whittington, 2014) and there is a
fundamental issue remaining. Zero-day vulnerabili-
ties are computer-software vulnerabilities that are un-
known to those who would be interested in mitigat-
ing the vulnerability (including the entity responsible
to operate a cloud application). Until a vulnerability
is mitigated, hackers can exploit it to adversely af-
fect computer programs, data, additional computers
or a network. For zero-day exploits, the probability
that vulnerabilities are patched is zero, so the exploit
should always succeed. Therefore, zero-day attacks
are a severe threat andwe have to draw a scary conclu-
sion: In principle attackers can establish footholds
in our systems whenever they want.
Recent research (Kratzke, 2017; Kratzke, 2018b)
made successfully use of elastic container platforms
(see Table 1) and their “designed for failure” capa-
bilities to realize transferability of cloud-native ap-
plications at runtime. By transferability, the con-
ducted research means that a cloud-native application
Figure 1: The cyber attack life cycle model. Adapted from the cyber attack lifecycle used by the M-Trends reports, see Table
2.
can be moved from one IaaS provider infrastructure
to another without any downtime. These platforms
are more and more used as distributed and elastic
runtime environments for cloud-native applications
(Kratzke and Quint, 2017) and can be understood as
a kind of cloud infrastructure unifying middleware
(Kratzke and Peinl, 2016). It should be possible to
make use of the same features to immunize cloud ap-
plications simply by moving an application within the
same provider infrastructure. To move anything from
A to A makes no sense at first glance. However,
let us be paranoid and aware that with some prob-
ability and at a given time, an attacker will be suc-
cessful and compromise at least one virtual machine
(Bilge and Dumitras, 2012). In these cases, a transfer
from A to A would be an efficient counter measure –
because the intruder immediately loses any hijacked
machine that is moved. To understand that, the reader
must know that our approach does not effectively
move a machine, it regenerates it. To move a machine
means to launch a compensating machine unknown
to the intruder and to terminate the former (hi-jacked)
machine. Whenever an application is moved all of its
virtual machines are regenerated. And this would ef-
fectively eliminate undetected hi-jacked machines.
The biological analogy of this strategy is called
“cell-regeneration” and the attack on ill cells is coor-
dinated by an immune system. This paper describes
first ideas for such a kind of immune system following
this outline. To provide some context for the reader,
Section 2 will explain the general life-cycle of a cyber
attack. It is assumed that every system can be pene-
trated due to zero-day exploits. Section 3 will sum-
marize some of our recent research to explain how
such immune systems could be built. Section 4 shows
some evaluation results measured from transferability
experiments. These numbers are used to estimate pos-
sible regeneration intervals for systems of different
sizes and to compare them with median dwell times
reported by security companies over the last seven
years (see Table 2). The advantages and limitations
of this proposal are related to other work in Section 5.
Finally, this proposal is discussed from a more criti-
cal point view in Section 6 to derive future research
challenges in Section 7.
2 CYBER ATTACK LIFE CYCLE
Figure 1 shows the cyber attack life cycle model
which is used by the M-Trends reports1 to report
developments in cyber attacks over the years. Ac-
cording to this model, an attacker passes through
different stages to complete a cyber attack mis-
sion. It starts with initial reconnaissance and com-
promising of access means. These steps are very
often supported by social engineering methodolo-
gies (Krombholz et al., 2015) and phishing attacks
(Gupta et al., 2016). The goal is to establish a
foothold near the system of interest. All these steps
are not covered by this paper, because technical so-
lutions are not able to harden the weakest point in
security – the human being. The following steps of
this model are more interesting for this paper. Ac-
1http://bit.ly/2m7UAYb (visited 9th Nov. 2017)
Table 2: Undetected days on victim systems reported by
M-Trends. External and internal discovery data is reported
since 2015. No data could be found for 2011.
Year External notification Internal discovery Median
2010 - - 416
2011 - - ?
2012 - - 243
2013 - - 229
2014 - - 205
2015 320 56 146
2016 107 80 99
cording to the life cycle model the attacker’s goal is
to escalate privileges to get access to the target sys-
tem. Because this leaves trails on the system which
could reveal a security breach, the attacker is moti-
vated to compromise this forensic trail. According
to security reports attackers make more and more use
of counter-forensic measures to hide their presence
and impair investigations. These reports refer to batch
scripts used to clear event logs and securely delete ar-
bitrary files. The technique is simple, but the intrud-
ers’ knowledge of forensic artifacts demonstrate in-
creased sophistication, as well as their intent to persist
in the environment. With a barely detectable foothold,
the internal reconnaissance of the victim’s network is
carried out to allow the lateral movement to the target
system. This is a complex and lengthy process and
may even take weeks. So, infiltrated machines have
worth for attackers and tend to be used for as long as
possible. Table 2 shows how astonishingly many days
on average an intruder has access to a victim system.
So, basically there is the requirement, that an unde-
tected attacker should lose access to compromised
nodes of a system as fast as possible. But how?
3 REGENERATE-ABLE CLOUD
APPLICATIONS
Our recent research dealt mainly with vendor lock-
in and the question how to design cloud-native appli-
cations that are transferable between different cloud
service providers. One aspect that can be learned
from this is that there is no common understand-
ing of what a cloud-native application really is. A
kind of software that is “intentionally designed for
the cloud” is an often heard but vacuous phrase.
However, noteworthy similarities exist between var-
ious view points on cloud-native applications (CNA)
(Kratzke and Quint, 2017). A common approach is
to define maturity levels in order to categorize dif-
ferent kinds of cloud applications (see Table 3).
(Fehling et al., 2014) proposed the IDEAL model for
CNAs. A CNA should strive for an isolated state, is
distributed, provides elasticity in a horizontal scal-
ing way, and should be operated on automated de-
ploymentmachinery. Finally, its components should
be loosely coupled.
(Balalaie et al., 2015) stress that these proper-
ties are addressed by cloud-specific architecture
and infrastructure approaches like Microservices
(Newman, 2015), API-based collaboration, adap-
tion of cloud-focused patterns (Fehling et al., 2014),
and self-service elastic platforms that are used to
deploy and operate these microservices via self-
contained deployment units (containers). Table 1 lists
some of these platforms that provide additional op-
erational capabilities on top of IaaS infrastructures
like automated and on-demand scaling of application
instances, application health management, dynamic
routing and load balancing as well as aggregation of
logs and metrics (Kratzke and Quint, 2017).
If the reader understands and accepts the com-
monality that cloud-native applications are operated
(more and more often) on elastic – often container-
based – platforms, it is an obvious idea to delegate
the responsibility to immunize cloud applications to
these platforms. Recent research showed that the op-
eration of these elastic container platforms and the de-
sign of applications running on-top of them should be
handled as two different engineering problems. This
often solves several issues in modern cloud-native ap-
plication engineering (Kratzke, 2018b). And that is
not just true for the transferability problem but might
be an option to tackle zero-day exploits. These kind
of platforms could be an essential part of the immune
system of modern cloud-native applications.
Furthermore, self-service elastic platforms are
Table 3: Cloud Application Maturity Model, adapted
from OPEN DATA CENTER ALLIANCE Best Practices
(Ashtikar et al., 2014)
Level Maturity Criteria
3 Cloud - Transferable across infrastructure providers at
native runtime and without interruption of service.
- Automatically scale out/in based on stimuli.
2 Cloud - State is isolated in a minimum of services.
resilient - Unaffected by dependent service failures.
- Infrastructure agnostic.
1 Cloud - Composed of loosely coupled services.
friendly - Services are discoverable by name.
- Components are designed to cloud patterns.
- Compute and storage are separated.
0 Cloud - Operated on virtualized infrastructure.
ready - Instantiateable from image or script.
Figure 2: The control theory inspired execution control loop compares the intended state ρ of an elastic container platform
with the current state σ and derives necessary scaling actions. These actions are processed by the execution pipeline explained
in Figure 3. So, platforms can be operated elastically in a set of synchronized IaaS infrastructures. Explained in details by
(Kratzke, 2017).
really “bulletproofed” (Stine, 2015). Apache Mesos
(Hindman et al., 2011) has been successfully oper-
ated for years by companies like Twitter or Net-
flix to consolidate hundreds of thousands of compute
nodes. Elastic container platforms are designed for
failure and provide self-healing capabilities via auto-
placement, auto-restart, auto-replication and auto-
scaling features. They will identify lost containers
(for whatever reasons, e.g. process failure or node un-
availability) and will restart containers and place them
on remaining nodes. These features are absolutely
necessary to operate large-scale distributed systems
in a resilient way. However, the same features can be
used intentionally to purge “compromised nodes”.
(Kratzke, 2017) demonstrated a software proto-
type that provides the control process shown in Fig-
ure 2 and Figure 3. This process relies on an in-
tended state ρ and a current state σ of a container
cluster. If the intended state differs from the cur-
rent state (ρ 6= σ), necessary adaption actions are de-
duced (creation and attachment/detachment of nodes,
creation and termination of security groups) and pro-
cessed by an execution pipeline fully automatically
(see Figure 3) to reach the intended state ρ. With this
kind of control process, a cluster can be simply re-
sized by changing the intended amount of nodes in
the cluster. If the cluster is shrinking and nodes have
to be terminated, affected containers of running appli-
cations will be rescheduled to other available nodes.
The downside of this approach is, that this will
only work for Level 2 (cloud resilient) or Level 3
(cloud native) applications (see Table 3) which by de-
sign, can tolerate dependent service failures (due to
node failures and container rescheduling). However,
for that kind of Level 2 or Level 3 application, we
can use the same control process to regenerate nodes
of the container cluster. The reader shall consider a
cluster with σ = N nodes. If we want to regenerate
one node, we change the intended state to ρ = N + 1
nodes which will add one new node to the cluster
(σ′ = N + 1). And in a second step, we will decrease
the intended size of the cluster to ρ′ = N again, which
has the effect that one node of the cluster is terminated
(σ′′ = N). So, a node is regenerated simply by adding
one node and deleting one node. We could even re-
generate the complete cluster by changing the cluster
size in the following way: σ = N 7→ σ′ = 2N 7→ σ′′ =
N. But, this would consumemuch more resources be-
cause the cluster would double its size for a limited
amount of time. A more resource efficient way would
be to regenerate the cluster in N steps: σ = N 7→ σ′ =
N+1 7→ σ′′ = N 7→ ... 7→ σ2N−1 = N +1 7→ σ2N = N.
This should make the general idea clear. The reader
is referred to (Kratzke, 2018b) for more details, es-
pecially if the reader is interested in the multi-cloud
capabilities, that are not covered by this paper due to
Figure 3: The execution pipeline processes necessary actions to transfer the current state σ into the intended state ρ. See
(Kratzke, 2018b) for more details.
page limitations.
Whenever such a regeneration is triggered, all –
even undetected – hijacked machines would be ter-
minated and replaced by other machines, but the ap-
plications would be unaffected. For an attacker, this
means losing their foothold in the system completely.
Imagine this would be done once a day or even more
frequently?
4 EVALUATION RESULTS
The execution pipeline presented in Figure 3 was
evaluated by operating and transferring two elastic
platforms (Swarm Mode of Docker 17.06 and Kuber-
netes 1.7). The platforms operated a reference “sock-
shop” application being one of the most complete ref-
erence applications for microservices architecture re-
search (Aderaldo et al., 2017). Table 4 lists the ma-
chine types that show a high similarity across differ-
ent providers (Kratzke and Quint, 2015).
The evaluation of (Kratzke, 2018b) demonstrated
that most time is spent on the IaaS level (creation and
termination of nodes and security groups) and not on
the elastic platform level (joining, draining nodes).
The measured differences on infrastructures provided
by different providers is shown in Figure 4. For the
current use case the reader can ignore the times to
create and delete a security group (because that is a
one time action). However, there will be many node
creations and terminations. According to our exe-
cution pipeline shown in Figure 3, a node creation
(σ = N 7→ σ′ = N + 1) involves the durations to cre-
ate a node (request of the virtual machine including
all installation and configuration steps), to adjust se-
curity groups the cluster is operated in and to join
the new node into the cluster. The shutdown of a
node (σ = N 7→ σ′ = N−1) involves the termination
of the node (this includes the platform draining and
deregistering of the node and the request to terminate
the virtual machine) and the necessary adjustment of
the security group. So, for a complete regeneration
of a node (σ = N 7→ σ′ = N + 1 7→ σ′′ = N) we have
to add these runtimes. Table 5 lists these values per
infrastructure.
Even on the “slowest” infrastructure, a node can
Table 4: Used machine types and regions for evaluation
Provider Region Master type Worker type
AWS eu-west-1 m4.xlarge m4.large
GCE europe-west1 n1-standard-4 n1-standard-2
Azure europewest Standard A3 Standard A2
OS own datacenter m1.large m1.medium
Figure 4: Infrastructure specific runtimes of IaaS opera-
tions. Taken from (Kratzke, 2018b).
be regenerated in about 10 minutes. In other words,
one can regenerate six nodes every hour or up to
144 nodes a day or a cluster of 432 nodes every 72h
(which is the reporting time requested by the EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation). If the reader com-
pares a 72h regeneration time of a more than 400 node
cluster (most systems are not so large) with the me-
dian value of 99 days that attackers were present on a
victim system in 2016 (see Table 2) the benefit of the
proposed approach should become obvious.
5 RELATEDWORK
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are
currently no approaches making intentional use of
virtual machine regeneration for security purposes.
However, the proposed approach is derived from
multi-cloud scenarios and their increased require-
ments on security. And there are several promis-
ing approaches dealing with multi-cloud scenarios.
So, all of them could show comparable opportu-
nities. But often, these approaches come along
with a lot of inner complexity. A container based
approach seems to handle this kind of complex-
ity better. There are some good survey papers on
this (Barker et al., 2015; Petcu and Vasilakos, 2014;
Table 5: Durations to regenerate a node (median values)
Provider Creation Secgroup Joining Term. Total
AWS 70 s 1 s 7 s 2 s 81 s
GCE 100 s 8 s 9 s 50 s 175 s
Azure 380 s 17 s 7 s 180 s 600 s
OS 110 s 2 s 7 s 5 s 126 s
Toosi et al., 2014; Grozev and Buyya, 2014).
To secure the forensic trail is essential
for anomaly detection approaches in log data
(Fu et al., 2009; Wurzenberger et al., 2017).
Therefore (Duncan and Whittington, 2016a;
Duncan and Whittington, 2016b) propose to use
an immutable database for this purpose, which they
suggested to be kept in a remote location from the
main cloud system. Further research deals with
append-only data structures on untrusted servers
(Pulls and Peeters, 2015). Other approaches propose
building a secure and reliable file synchronization
service using multiple cloud synchronization services
as untrusted storage providers (Han et al., 2015).
Further approaches focus on the integrity of logs
and ensure their integrity by hash-chain schemes
and proofs of past logs published periodically by the
cloud providers (Zawoad et al., 2016). The question
remains, whether these approaches are scalable
enough to provide robust logging means for the
forensic trail of up to thousands of nodes. Mes-
saging solutions like Kafka (Wang et al., 2015) or
logging stacks like the ELK-Stack are bullet-proofed
technologies for consolidating logs but assume to
be operated in a trusted environment which often
ends in very complicated kind of double logging
architectures (Kratzke, 2018a).
6 CRITICAL DISCUSSION
The idea of using an immune system like approach
to remove undetected intruders in virtual machines
seems to a lot of experts intriguing. But state of the art
is, that this is not done. And there might be reasons
for that and open questions the reader should consider.
Several reviewers remarked that the proposal can
be compared with the approach to restart periodically
virtual machines that have memory leak issues. This
has nothing to do with security concerns, and could
be applied to traditional (non-cloud) systems as well.
So, the approach may have even a broader focus than
presented (which is not a bad thing).
Another question is how to detect “infected”
nodes? The presented approach selects nodes sim-
ply at random. This will hit every node at some
time. The same could be done using a round-robin
approach but a round-robin strategy would be bet-
ter predictable for an attacker. However, both strate-
gies will create a lot of unnecessary regenerations
and that leaves obviously room for improvements.
It seems obvious to search for solutions like pre-
sented by (Fu et al., 2009; Wurzenberger et al., 2017)
to provide some “intelligence” for the identification
of “suspicious” nodes. This would limit regenera-
tions to likely “infected” nodes. In all cases it is es-
sential for anomaly detection approaches to secure
the forensic trail (Duncan and Whittington, 2016a;
Duncan and Whittington, 2016b).
Furthermore, to regenerate nodes periodically or
even randomly is likely nontrivial in practice and de-
pends on the state management requirements for the
affected nodes. Therefore, this paper proposes the ap-
proach only as a promising solution for Level 2 or 3
cloud applications (see Table 3) that are operated on
elastic container platforms. That kind of applications
have eligible state management characteristics. But,
this is obviously a limitation.
One could be further concerned about exploits that
are adaptable to bio-inspired systems. Stealthy res-
ident worms dating back to the old PC era would
be an example. This might be especially true for
the often encountered case of not entirely stateless
services, when data-as-code dependencies or code-
injection vulnerabilities exist. Furthermore, attackers
could shift their focus to the platform itself in order
to disable the regeneration mechanism as a first step.
On the other hand, this could be easily detected – but
there could exist more sophisticated attacks.
Finally, there is obviously room and need for a
much more detailed evaluation. The effectiveness of
this approach needs a large scale and real world eval-
uation with more complex cloud native applications
using multiple coordinated virtual machines. This is
up for ongoing research and should be kept in mind.
7 CONCLUSION
There is still no such thing as an impenetrable system.
Once attackers successfully breach a system, there is
little to prevent them from doing arbitrary harm – but
we can reduce the available time for the intruder to
do this. The presented approach evolved mainly from
transferability research questions for cloud-native ap-
plications. But it can be the foundation for an “im-
mune system” inspired approach to tackle zero-day
exploits. The main intent is simply to massively
reduce the time for an attacker acting undetected.
Therefore, this paper proposed to regenerate virtual
machines (the cells of an IT-system) with a much
higher frequency than usual to purge even undetected
intruders. Evaluations on infrastructures provided by
AWS, GCE, Azure and OpenStack showed that a vir-
tual machine can be regenerated between two minutes
(AWS) and 10 minutes (Azure). The reader should
compare these times with recent cyber security re-
ports. In 2016 an attacker was undetected on a victim
system for about 100 days. The presented approach
means for intruders that their undetected time on vic-
tim systems is not measured in months or days any-
more, it would be measured in minutes.
Such a biology inspired immune system solution
is charming but may also involve downsides. To re-
generate too many nodes at the same time would let
the system run “hot”. The reader might know this
health state from own experiences as fever. And if the
immune system attacks to many unaffected (healthy)
nodes again and again, this could be even called an
auto-immune disease. Both states are not the best op-
eration modes of immune systems. Although the pre-
sented approach can limit available time for an attack
substantially, we should consider that even in a very
short amount of time an attacker could delete (parts)
of the cloud forensic trail. This could limit the effec-
tiveness of “suspect node” detection mechanisms. To
use external and trusted append-only logging systems
seems somehow obvious. However, existing solutions
rely very often on trusted environments.
So, further research should investigate how “re-
generating” platforms and append-only logging sys-
tems can be operated on untrusted environmentswith-
out fostering unwanted and non-preferable effects
known from the human immune system like fever
or even auto-immune diseases. The critical discus-
sion in Section 6 showed that there is need for ad-
ditional evaluation and room for more in-depth re-
search. However, several reviewers remarked inde-
pendently that the basic idea is so “intriguing”, that it
should be considered more consequently.
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